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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF REGISTRATION 
OF DEPARTMENT OF REGULATION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JEFF STONE and/or LAKEWOOD 
ENTERPRISES, INC., dba NEO-
DENTURE CLINIC, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 15711 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction for contempt of 
court on 120 separate violations of a temporary restraining 
order wherein appellants had been enjoined from engaging in 
the practice of dentistry without a license. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court. From a verdict of 
guilty the defendants-appellants appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent requests this court to affirm the judg-
ment of the court below. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The material facts as outlined by appellants and 
as supported by the record are correct and accurate. There 
is no need, therefore, to restate them in respondent's brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES IMPOSED BY THE 
COURT BELOW FOR THE SEPARATE ACTS OF CONTEMPT 
COMHITTED BY APPELLANTS WAS PROPER AND IS 
SUPPORTED BY LEGAL AUTHORITY. 
Appellants argue that the consecutive sentences 
imposed upon them for each of the 120 violations of the 
restraining order are invalid. Neither the statutes nor 
the cases cited by appellants support this argument on the 
facts. 
Utah Code Annotated, § 76-1-401, and Utah Code 
Annotated, § 76-3-401, simply allow the district court to 
exercise its discretion as to whether sentences are to be 
served consecutively or concurrently. The latter section 
seems to apply to felonies and states in subpart (3) that 
a court can impose consecutive sentences for offenses aris-
ing out of a single criminal episode. These sections cannot 
be construed to prohibit an imposition of consecutive sen-
tences for separate acts of contempt. They are hardly rel-
evant. 
-2-
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Appellants cite McCoy v. Severson, 118 U. 502, 
for the proposition that at conunon law sentences imposed 
at the same time for separate crimes were to run concurrently 
unless statute or the court directed otherwise. In the case 
at bar the court directed otherwise. 
The cases cited by appellants are all distinguish-
able from the case at bar. State v. Willhote, 40 N.J. Sup. 
405, 123 A.2d 237; In re Ward, 51 Cal Rptr 272, 64 C.2d 672, 
414 P.2d 400, cert denied 385 U.S. 923, 17 L.Ed 2d 147; and 
State v. Starlight Club, 17 U.2d 174, 406 P.2d 912, are not 
contempt cases and are not factually similar to the case at 
bar. State v. Willhote, supra, involved two closely prox-
imated reckless driving offenses; In re Ward, supra, in-
volved a lesser included offense (robbery); and State v. 
Starlight Club, supra, involved statutory violations of 
Utah's liquor laws that were induced on different occasions. 
Gautreaux v. Gautreaux, 220 La. 564, 57 So. 2d 188; Beck v. 
Frontier Airlines, 174 Neb. 172, 116 N.W.2d 281; United 
States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148; Yates v. United States, 355 
U.S. 66, 2 L.Ed 2d 95; and Codespoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 
U.S. 506, 41 L.Ed 2d 912, are contempt cases. Gautreaux, 
supra, stated that each case must be analyzed by itself to 
determine whether there are separate acts or one continuous 
act. That case held two closely related outbursts in a 
-3-
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court proceeding to be one continuous act. In Beck, supra, 
the contempt consisted of a failure for an airline to obey 
an affirmative injunction. The court held the contempt to 
be one continuous act but upheld the $12,000 fine ($1,000/ 
day). This case is easily distinguishable from the case at 
bar. In Beck, supra, there were no separate acts as in the 
case at bar - there was just one period of refusal and in-
action. In both Orman, supra, and Yate~, supra, the court 
refused to allow consecutive punishments for each refusal 
to answer questions in a single court proceeding. The 
court in Orman, supra, explained the reason for its deci-
sion, i.e., that the questions related to the same facts 
and line of questioning. In Codespoti, supra, the court 
allowed to stand a series of direct, sununary contempt sen-
tences all imposed in a single court proceeding. None of 
these cases are factually close to the case at bar. 
As the court in Gautreaux, supra, stated, each 
case must be analyzed by itself to determine whether there 
are separate acts or just one continuous act. In the case 
at bar, appellants wilfully chose to violate the restrainin~ 
order after having been given formal notice of it by per-
sonal service. By appellant Stone's own admission, he made 
120 sets of dentures in direct violation of the order. (R. 
49) Each set was made for a different party under unique 
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circumstances. Appellant Stone was completely aware each 
time that his services for a particular individual violated 
the order. Respondent submits that the trial judge cor-
rectly ruled that each of the 120 violations was a separate 
act of contempt. The cases that are factually on point all 
recognize that consecutive sentences are proper for separate 
acts of contempt. These cases all support the trial court's 
finding of separate acts of contempt. 
In Ex Parte Genecov, 143 Tx. 476, 186 S.W.2d 225, 
petitioner was charged with thirty-six separate violations 
of an injunction forbidding him and others from discharging 
pollutants into certain rivers. The trial judge affixed 
his punishment at $50 fine and one day's imprisonment for 
each violation, aggregating a total fine of $1,500.00 and 
thirty days' imprisonment. Although the fine was much 
greater than the statutory maximum for a single contempt, 
the Texas Supreme Court upheld the judgment and stated that 
due process had not been violated. In Rapp v. United States, 
et al., 146 F.2d 548, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a judgment 
below imposing a fine of $500 for three acts and a 30-day 
jail sentence for each of the other three acts. The judge 
ordered the jail sentences to be served concurrently, 
presumably due to the "stiffness"of each sentence. The 
appellant had received from six tenants higher rentals than 
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allowed by a previously issued injunction. For other cases 
on point where courts have assessed multiple contempt pen-
alties for violations of an injunction or restraining order, 
see Donovan v. Superior Court, 39 Cal.2d 848, 250 P.2d 246; 
Golden Gate v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. 187, 3 P. 628; Solano 
-
Aquatic Club v. Superior Court, 165 Cal. 278, 131 P. 874; 
and State v. Mccarley, 74 Kan. 874, 87 P. 743. Also, see 
Kenimer v. State, 81 Ga. App. 437, 59 S.E.2d 296, where the 
court recognized that every day petitioner kept his child in 
violation of the court's order (238 days) could be deemed a 
separate act of contempt. 
It is quite clear from the foregoing authorities 
that when separate acts in contempt of an injunction or 
restraining order are established, the courts have assessed 
penalties for each act and the sentences have run consec-
utively. In the case at bar appellant Stone defiantly ad-
mitted to 120 separate acts of contempt, apparently belieri~ 
he could flout the law and receive a minimal penalty. 
The sentences for each act of one-half day in jail 
for appellant Stone and a $100 fine for the appellant cor-
poration are minimal. It seems obvious that the trial judge 
considered the aggregate jail sentence and fine to be just 
and simply used the separate acts as part of the computation 
to arrive at the proper sentences. In view of the 
-6-
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appellants' wilful defiance of the restraining order, it 
would do injustice to the judicial system for this court 
to adopt appellants' argument that the violations were but 
one continuous act and to impose a mere one-half day jail 
sentence on appellant Stone and a $100 fine on the corpora-
tion. 
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in 
holding appellants in contempt for 120 separate acts. 
POINT II 
THE SENTENCES IMPOSED UPON APPELLANTS ARE 
NOT EXCESSIVE AND DO BEAR A REASONABLE 
RELATIONSHIP TO THE GRAVITY OF THE OFFENSE. 
This court has stated that holding a party in 
contempt of court and the making of orders related thereto 
are matters that lie within the trial court's discretion, 
and that the trial judge's determinations will not be re-
versed or modified in the "absence of any action in that 
regard which is so unreasonable as to be classified as 
capricious and arbitrary, or a clear abuse of his discre-
tion." Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238. The 
trial judge is certainly in the best position to review all 
the facts and circumstances and determine the severity of 
the penalties. 
In light of the facts of this case, it cannot be 
said that the trial judge abused his discretion in 
-7-
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sentencing appellant Stone to sixty days in jail and fin-
ing appellant corporation $12,000. Appellant Stone com-
mitted 120 separate acts in violation of the restraining 
order. These acts were wilful and in direct defiance of 
the order. He had full knowledge of this court's recent 
decision that his "denture practice" was encompassed with-
in the practice of dentistry as defined by statute. He 
was given notice of the subsequently issued restraining 
order and chose to flout it, apparently thinking he could 
get away with a minimal penalty or none at all. There are 
no mitigating factors in this case. A more open defiance 
of a court order than that in the case at bar is unimag-
inable. This is the sort of open, unjustified contempt of 
the judicial system that thecrime of contempt is meant to 
punish. 
Appellant Stone argues that since his actions 
were not shown to be seriously injurious to the public, 
that his sentence should be light. Apparently this was a 
part of his calculated plan to defy the restraining order. 
The purpose of criminal contempt is to punish the contemnor 
in order to vindicate the authority of the judicial system. 
Therefore, the argument of "little public injury" is not 
relevant or material to the issues on this appeal. 
Appellant Stone also argues that a sixty-day jail 
sentence is ludicrous in view of today's sentencing 
-8-
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standards. This appears to be yet another consideration 
in his calculated plan to defy the order. Again, the 
trial judge is in the best position to determine the sen-
tence and whether or not it is to be suspended in part or 
whether the sentences for each act are to run concurrently 
or consecutively. 
The cases cited by appellants in an effort to 
establish that their sentences are excessive are easily 
distinguishable. In Harris v. Harris, 14. U.2d 96, 377 
P.2d 1007, the contemnor father had made a substantial ef-
fort to comply with the child support decree. Appellant 
in the case at bar made no effort to comply, but quite to 
the contrary, chose to flout the order. In Shotkin v. 
Atchison, 235 P.2d 990, the contemnor was not guilty of 
numerous acts as in the case at bar, and the failure to 
comply in that case seems much less egregious than appel-
lant Stone's open defiance. Also, in Shotkin, supra, it 
was found that the trial court could have easily avoided 
the contempt. 
The trial judge did not consider a sixty-day 
jail sentence for appellant Stone and a $12,000 fine for 
the appellant corporation to be excessive. In light of 
appellant Stone's wilful defiance of the restraining order, 
the legal substance of which had already been decided by 
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this court, it cannot be said that the trial judge abused 
his discretion when sentencing appellants. 
CONCLUSION 
The determination of the trial court in contempt 
cases is within that court's discretion and will not be 
reversed or modified unless that discretion is abused. 
The cases that are factually similar to the case 
at bar recognize the power of the courts to impose consec-
utive sentences upon contemnors for separate acts of con-
contempt in violation of an injunction or restraining order, 
The trial court's finding that appellants are guilty of 120 
separate acts of contempt is supported by fact and law and 
was not an abuse of discretion. 
In view of appellants' open defiance of the re-
straining order, the sentences and fines imposed were not 
excessive and were not an abuse of discretion. The judgment 
of the trial court should be affirmed. 
1978. 
Respectfully submitted this 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
LEON A. HALGREN 
day of June, 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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